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The variability of protection rates within sectors is frequently particularly high in agriculture 
relative to non-agriculture. Standard aggregation procedures ignore the variability within 
sectors, and underweight the importance of highly protected sectors. It therefore seems likely 
that they underestimate the potential benefits of agricultural trade reform relative to non-
agricultural reform. This study examines this question using a new procedure for aggregating 
trade distortions. It finds that the key impact of using better aggregators is to increase the 
benefits of both agricultural and non-agricultural reform. It finds that using optimal aggregation 
procedures increases the measured importance of agricultural trade reform relative to non-
agriculturalreform from a very high initial level, but only by around two percentage points. 
JEL:  F13, F14, Q13, Q17, Q18. Keywords: agricultural trade, nonagricultural trade; trade 
distortions; tariffs; aggregation; World Trade Organization; WTO; trade reform. 
 
1  Introduction 
Agricultural trade distortions are frequently higher and more variable than those prevailing in 
other sectors of the economy. This would generally be expected to make them more costly, other 
things equal, than protection to other sectors. Consistent with this, Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2006, Table 12.6) concluded that almost two-thirds of the cost of global 
protection—and roughly the same share of the cost of merchandise distortions to developing 
countries— resulted from agricultural trade barriers. This result is particularly striking given that 
agricultural trade is less than 10 percent of global trade, and that production is an even smaller 
share of the global economy. Clearly, the size of the potential welfare gains from reforming 
agricultural trade raise the priority to be placed on achieving liberalization in this exceedingly 
difficult sector.  
One concern with this finding is that past approaches to modeling reform may have been 
vulnerable to differences in the approach to aggregation used in global trade reform. Partly 2 
 
because of the heterogeneity of agricultural trade barriers, most of the databases for global 
trade—such as the widely-used GTAP database—tend to provide a much finer disaggregation of 
the agricultural sector (20 different sectors over a total of 57) than of the remainder of the 
economy. As a matter of fact an agricultural related sector in the GTAP database includes 36 
product (HS6 nomenclature) when a manufacturing sector includes nearly 200 products. Since 
the measured cost of non-uniform protection rises with the degree of disaggregation used in 
analyzing its impact, there is potentially a risk that the higher measured costs of agricultural 
distortions arise simply from the approach used to analyze the question.  
In this paper, we first examine the extent to which agricultural protection is—as is widely 
asserted—higher and more variable than protection to non-agricultural merchandise trade. We 
then turn to a newly-developed approach to tariff aggregation that allows us to aggregate from 
the finest level of disaggregation available in our dataset. Not only does this approach improve 
our estimates of the overall welfare impacts of liberalization, but it also sharply reduces our 
vulnerability to differences in the degree of sectoral disaggregation between sectors.  
2  Patterns of Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Protection 
Based on the MAcMapHS6 database (Boumellassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2009),  the world 
average protection in 2004 is estimated at 5.1 percent, acknowledging that 40 percent of world 
trade takes place under duty-free Most Favored Nations (MFN) rates. This relatively low Ad 
Valorem Equivalent (AVE) number hides a heterogeneous and complex pattern of protection, 
reflecting historical and political differences across countries and sectors. Here is a quick 
overview based on Table 1:  
  The average level of protection decreases as the level of a country‘s development 
increases:  in 2004, the average protection is 3.3 percent for high-income countries 
(HICs), 9.6 percent for low and middle income countries (MLICs), and 12.2 percent for 
least-developed countries (LDCs).  
  The agricultural sector is more protected (18.9 percent) than the manufactured goods 
sector (4.5 percent) or the extractive-energy products sector (1.3 percent). This gap 
reflects the political economy of agriculture in most countries as well as the mechanical 3 
 
consequences of agriculture‘s exclusion from previous rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations.  
The protectionist bias in agriculture and on final products rises with the level of 
development of a country. Relative to their average level of protection, HICs give appreciably 
more protection to their agricultural sector. Indeed, rich countries tax their agricultural imports 
6.7 times more than manufactured goods. The ratio of agricultural protection to industrial 
protection decreases for MLICs and LDCs: 2.3 and 1.2, respectively. MLICs and LDCs, with 
scarce administrative resources, pay more attention to the revenue-raising effects of tariffs than 
do the industrial countries, where tariffs are a very minor source of revenue.  
 
Table 1 Average tariffs by region and product, Percentage 
  World  HICs  MLICs  LDCs 
Agricultural goods  18.9  18  20.8  14.1 
Industrial goods  4.4  2.7  8.9  11.7 
Resources  1.9  0.6  5.6  12.7 
All products   5.1  3.3  9.6  12.2 
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 2004. Note: HICs stand for High Income Countries, MLICs for Middle and Low Income 
Countries and LDCs for Least Developed Countries. 
 
We know from basic theory that the cost of protection depends not just on the average 
level of protection, but also upon the dispersion of tariff rates within each category. The 
importance of tariff dispersion is made very clear by the textbook illustration that the cost of a 
tariff is related not to the level of protection but to its square. On this dimension, the difference 
between agricultural and non-agricultural protection rates is even starker than in the case of the 
mean.  
Some key figures of the distribution of the power of the tariff rate are evident in Table 2, 
which presents estimates for a range of selected countries.  First, the global coefficient of 
variation of the power of the MFN tariff is 82 percent for all products but equals 11 percent for 
non-agricultural products and nearly 210 percent for agricultural products. So, at the global level, 
tariff heterogeneity is driven by the sharp difference between agricultural and non-agricultural 
products and by tariff heterogeneity within the set of agricultural products.  
At the country level, the coefficient of variation of the power of tariff varies widely from 
0 percent in Hong Kong and 1 percent in Chile to 606 percent in the Solomon Islands. Except for 4 
 
insular economies, Egypt has the largest value for developing countries (121 percent). Among 
rich countries, Iceland (117 percent), Norway (77 percent), and Switzerland (51 percent) have 
the most distorted trade policies. In general, intra-agriculture variation is stronger than intra-
industry variation for developed countries and most developing countries. However, we can find 
the reverse situation for countries with comparative advantage in agriculture (Australia, 
Argentina, Georgia). 
Table 2 Coefficient of Variation of the power of the MFN Tariffs, Percentage 
 
  All  Non-agriculture  Agriculture 
Argentina  6  7  4 
Australia  6  6  2 
Bangladesh  9  9  9 
Bolivia  2  2  0 
Botswana  20  10  45 
Burundi  12  12  10 
Canada  17  5  40 
Chile   1  0  1 
Ivory Coast   6  6  6 
Egypt  121  11  233 
EU25  14  3  30 
Georgia  3  3  1 
Iran  22  22  23 
Japan  47  3  93 
Russian Federation  6  5  8 
Senegal  6  6  6 
South Africa  20  10  45 
Switzerland  51  7  84 
USA  8  4  17 
World  82  11  209 
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 2004. Note: We compute the trade weighted coefficients of variation of the 
power of the MFN tariff.  
 
When using a global general equilibrium model to analyze the consequences of reform 
what matters is not the variation of tariffs within agriculture and non-agriculture as a whole, but 
within the sectors used in the sectors used in the analysis. If tariffs are highly variable across the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, but uniform within the sectors used in the analysis, then 5 
 
differences in the dispersion of tariffs may not matter for the conclusions. Figure 1 presents data 
on the part of the variation in protection that arises from variation within product groups.
1  
Figure 1 shows that the variation in tariffs within the product groups used to model 
reform is much greater for agriculture than for non-agriculture. Again, the tendency for 
agricultural tariffs to be more widely dispersed is stronger in regions with high agricultural 
protection, such as Japan; Korea/Taiwan (China); and Europe. Given the large differences in the 
dispersion of protection within the aggregated groups we use for analysis, it becomes particularly 
important to use an approach to aggregation that deals with this problem. Otherwise measures of 
the overall welfare impacts of liberalization—and of the relative importance for welfare of 
liberalization in different sectors—are likely to be misleading.  
 
                                                 
1 Product groups are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 
Figure 1 Coefficient of variation within the sectors used to model reform, Percentage 
 
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 2004. 
Note: For each sub sector given in appendix A, the coefficient of variation of the MFN tariff is computed. 
































































































































































































































































































3  The Aggregation Approach 
An important lesson from the literature on tariff aggregation (see Laborde, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe 2011), is that such indexes should be based on a model that relates the index to an 
economic objective. In this paper, our ultimate focus is on economic welfare, although we are 
interested in variables such as prices and trade volumes, partly for their own sake, and partly 
because they influence countries‘ welfare through terms of trade effects. Like Bach and Martin 
(2001), we assume that the structure of such a competitive, small open economy can be captured 
by the income-expenditure condition: 
 
  e(p,u)r(p,v)(eprp)'(ppw)f=0  (1) 
 
and the set of behavioral equations
2, 
 
  ep(p,u)rp(p,v)=m  (2) 
 
where e(p,u) is the expenditure function of the representative household; p is a vector of 
domestic  prices;  p
w  is  the  corresponding  vector  of  exogenous  external  prices;  u  is  domestic 
utility; r(p,v) is domestic revenue from production; v is a vector of productive resources; m is the 
vector of imports, and f is an exogenously-determined net financial inflow from abroad. Given 
this representation of the economy, we can define a balance-of-trade function, which captures the 
financial inflow necessary to keep utility u constant when domestic prices p change (Anderson 
and Neary (1996)) and provides a money measure of welfare changes in a small open economy. 
Based on equation (1) but taking the level of utility u0 as exogenous, B can be written as: 
 
  B(p,u0) = e(p,u0) r(p,v)(eprp)'(ppw)f = 0  (3) 
 
Many papers (such as Anderson and Neary 2007) that use the balance-of-trade function to 
capture,  for  instance,  the  trade-restricting  impact  of  distortions  use  a  very  simple  model  to 
estimate a single aggregator such as the Trade Restrictiveness Index. Here, by contrast, we want 
to be able to use a two-stage modeling approach that allows us to bring in information—such as 
                                                 
2We use bold letters for vectors. 8 
 
information  on  the  structure  of  production  and  domestic  demand—that  is  economically 
important, but available only at a much higher level of aggregation than data on trade and trade 
distortions.  In  this  way  we  can  combine  detailed  information  on  trade  distortions  with  the 
information  in  many  more  aggregated  structural  models  such  as  econometrically  estimated 
models of the type popularized by Kohli (2004); or with econometric (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
1992) or calibrated (Hertel 1997) general equilibrium models.  
The potential importance of such aggregation is clear when we recall that models of the type 
developed by Kohli have only a few sectors, and global computable general equilibrium models 
are typically solved with around 20 to 25 sectors. With four sectors in an estimated structural 
model of the type used by Kohli, there would be over 1300 traded goods per sector when using 
data on tariffs and trade at the highest degree of disaggregation available internationally—the 
six-digit level of the harmonized system. Even with 25 sectors, there are over 200 traded goods 
per sector, and tariffs frequently vary greatly within these sectors. 
In the first stage of our analysis we compute indices that capture the information about tariffs 
within sectors. In the second stage, we use these indices to solve a more aggregated model. 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) provide the theoretical underpinnings for this type of two-stage 
modeling. If the utility function is weakly separable, then the consumer‘s maximization problem 
can be decomposed into the maximization of sub-utility functions over categories of products, 
and  at  a  higher  level,  maximization  of  total  utility  over  the  sub-utility  functions.  If  another 
condition—homotheticity  of  preferences  at  the  lower  level—is  satisfied,  then  two  stage-
budgeting based can be used, with decisions at a higher level of aggregation based on aggregate 
prices and quantities passed up from the lower level. In a similar fashion, Chambers (1988) and 
Lloyd (1994) show that weak separability of the production function and homotheticity of the 
sub-aggregator functions allow two-stage decision-making approaches to be used to represent 
production technologies. 
In the rest of the paper we assume that the conditions  needed  for the  formation of  sub-
aggregate price and quantity indexes have been met. These assumptions are inherent in use of 
any aggregates, such as trade-weighted averages, and are not an additional requirement of our 
approach relative to use of traditional aggregators.  
We further assume, following Armington (1969), that domestic products are differentiated 
from  imported  products  for  any  given  composite  good,  such  as  ―crops‖.  If  the  prices  of 9 
 
domestically-produced goods are determined by returns on export markets, then r(p,v) will be 
invariant  to  changes  in  tariffs,  and  import  demand  will  equal  ep(p-pw),  allowing  further 
simplification of the model. It is useful to follow standard practice in the computable general 
equilibrium  modeling  tradition,  and  to  assume  separability  between  domestic  and  imported 
goods. If this is not done, the tariff revenue function may be non-monotonic in the tariff revenue 
aggregator with two values of the tariff aggregator—one on each side of the peak of the Laffer 
Curve—being consistent with any given tariff revenue
3. In the following section, we develop 
aggregators  for  the  two  components  of  the  model —the  expenditure  and  tariff  revenue 
functions—needed to capture the welfare impacts of tariffs in a small, open economy. 
The tariff aggregator for expenditure 
Based on the assumptions discussed above, we can define an expenditure function consistent 
with each of the sub-utility functions used in the analysis. If ei is the expenditure function for 
commodity group i, then:  
  ei=ei(pi,ui0)  (4) 
 
where pi is the vector of domestic prices for goods in set i and ui0 is the initial utility level 
associated with consumption of goods in this set. Like Bach and Martin (2001), we define the 
tariff  aggregator for  expenditure  on  commodity  group  i  as the  uniform  tariff,  τie,  which,  to 
maintain sub-utility level ui0, requires the same level of expenditure on imported commodities in 
the group as the observed vector of commodity-specific tariffs. At any given utility level, this 
aggregator is optimal for measuring the impact of the tariff on domestic prices given any vector 
of world prices, and hence for the quantity of imports demanded, and the terms of trade in a 
multi-country model. Since we are assuming homotheticity of the aggregator function, ei=pi.ui 
where pi is the price of the composite good, and ui is the volume of its consumption aggregated at 
domestic prices. 
We can define the tariff aggregator for expenditure on commodity group i as the uniform 
tariff τie: 
  τie=[τie|ei(piw(1+τie), ui0)=ei(pi, ui0)]  (5) 
                                                 
3 Since protection levels are generally determined primarily by political-economy pressures, rather than by tariff 
revenue goals, this ambiguity cannot be resolved by choosing the tariff rate to the left of the peak of the tariff 
revenue curve. 10 
 
Since the commodity aggregators that we use are defined only over traded goods, we can use 
the homogeneity of degree one of the expenditure function to solve for τie, obtaining:  
  τie=ei(pi, ui0)/ei(piw, ui0) -1.   (6) 
The tariff revenue aggregator 
Bach and Martin (2001) propose a tariff revenue aggregator defined in a similar fashion to the 
expenditure aggregator. A tariff revenue aggregator for commodity group i may be defined as the 
uniform tariff that will yield the same tariff revenue as the observed vector of disaggregated 
tariffs for that particular group of commodities, conditional on the utility level underlying the 
expenditure function: 
 
  iR=[iR|tri(piw(1+iR), ui0)=tri(pi, piw, ui0)]  (7) 
 
Manole and Martin (2005) focused on identifying a closed-form solution for this aggregator. 
Anderson (2009) uses a simpler approach that we follow here, of calculating a trade-weighted 
average with endogenous quantity weights optimally chosen by the importer at each set of tariffs. 
At the initial tariff, this weighted average is the same as the conventional fixed-weight average. 
As tariffs change, the weights in the tariff revenue aggregator are updated using the specified 
import demand functions, and the two averages diverge. When multiplied by the value of imports 
at external prices, this weighted average, τi
R, returns the correct value of tariff revenues for any 
given vector of tariff rates.  
Solving Global Models 
In a single-country, small-open-economy  model, the tariff  aggregator for expenditure can  be 
introduced into the expenditure function, and the tariff revenue aggregator into the tariff revenue 
equation, and the model used to solve for the welfare impacts of changes in tariffs. When this is 
implemented in a global model, however, a major difficulty arises because Walras‘ Law is not 
satisfied at the global level. When, for instance, a reduction in a particularly high tariff in one 
country  results  in  a  more  rapid  decline  in  expenditures  than  in  tariff  revenues,  the  country 
experiences a gain in real income without there being any corresponding increase in the value of 
production to meet the resulting increase in demand. 11 
 
This problem can be solved, following Anderson (2009), by recognizing that quantity indexes 
at domestic prices are different from quantity  indexes at world prices. Since expenditure on 
aggregate good i at domestic prices must equal expenditure on the good at border prices plus 
tariff revenue:  
 
  ui(1+ie)pw=xi(1+iR)pw  (8) 
and hence  
 
  ui=xi(1+iR)/(1+ie)  (9) 
 
where ui is the quantity of aggregate i consumed in the country (defined over domestic prices); 
xi* is the quantity aggregate (at world prices) exported from the rest of the world to the country 
of interest; and all other terms are as previously defined. 
The consequences of equations (8) and (9) are illustrated in Figure 2 by plotting the two 
indicators for all pairs of regions/sectors. The correlation is high, above 90 percent, but stronger 
for industry (0.96) than for agriculture (0.93). In addition the slope is much stronger for 
agriculture, It implies that the expenditure aggregator for agricultural sector is higher than for 
industry, illustrating also the large ―within sector‖ tariff heterogeneity in agriculture 12 
 
Figure 2 Measuring protection: Comparing Tariff revenue and Expenditure Aggregators 
 
 
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 2004. Note: For each sub sector given in appendix A, and region of appendix 
B, we compute the tariff revenue aggregator and the expenditure aggregator based on equations 8 and 9 
with an elasticity of substitution equals to 2. Each dot is a country/sector pair 
 
3.1  Implementation 
We use a two-tier strategy to implement this approach in the World Bank‘s  LINKAGE global 
computable general equilibrium model (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) that has been widely used 
for analysis of major policy reforms. Our first step was to modify the structure of the model to 
distinguish between the aggregates at domestic and world prices identified in equations (8) and 
(9).  We  then  calculated  the  tariff  aggregators  for  expenditure  and  tariff  revenues  using  the 
MacMapHS6 v2.1 database (Boumellassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2009) that provides detailed 
information on bilateral tariffs and trade flows at the HS6 level. Finally, we performed a series of 



















































The aggregation procedure 
For concreteness, we first present a simple illustration based on a one level aggregation problem 
where HS6 products are aggregated to the sectoral aggregation of the model. Then, we introduce 
real-world problems such as those arising from differences in the rates of protection applied on 
goods from different sources; where and where the model for an importing region is an aggregate 
of different countries. We focus first on the formation of aggregates for a single good, using data 
at the six-digit product level
4. 
The expenditure aggregator 
We first illustrate our approach in the simple case where one country imports goods from only 
one partner, the rest of the world. The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form  is an 
appealing choice for several reasons: (i) its simplicity and parsimony, (ii) the availability of some 
relevant parameter estimates; and (iii) the ability to handle situations where the number of firms 
or  commodities  is  endogenously  determined  (Feenstra  1994;  Zhai  2008).  Using  a  CES 
aggregator for products j being aggregated in group i, the price index for composite imported 
good i at domestic prices is (omitting the i index) given by: 
  p =(jj(pj
w(1+tj))1) 1/1         (10) 
where tj is the ad valorem tariff at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System.  
Since  our  focus  in  this  paper  is  primarily  on  aggregation  of  existing  products,  the  αj 
coefficients can be inferred using standard calibration procedures (Mansur and Whalley 1984). 
Given these values, the value of τ
e can be identified using  
   p =(jj(pj
w(1+tj))1) 1/(1 = (1+ τ
e).(jj(pj
w)1) 1/(1         (11) 
Which defines τ





w)1) 1/(1 - 1         (12) 
 
If we follow the usual convention in calibration of choosing units so that domestic prices equal 
unity, the αj‘s are given by the initial value shares at domestic prices and the initial value of  
 τ
e = (jj(1+tj)) 1/(1 - 1 
                                                 
4 Our usage differs slightly from Broda and Weinstein‘s (2003, p548) distinction between goods at the tariff-line 
level and varieties supplied by individual countries because we need to distinguish between composite goods, six-
digit products, and six-digit varieties.  14 
 
Base case: the tariff revenue aggregator 
As noted above, our tariff revenue aggregator is a trade-weighted index, but differs from the 
standard trade-weighted index in being calculated using trade weights that adjust in response to 
changes in tariff rates.  
     τ
R = Σi ti.pi
w.qi
 / Σk pk
w.qk
        (13) 
where  qi=αi(pi/p)
-σ.u  and,  in  contrast  with  the  corresponding  weight  in  a  traditional  trade-
weighted-average, the value of qi adjusts as tariff rates change. τ
R is computed in an aggregation 
module independent of the global model prior to its inclusion in the global model.  
Practical considerations 
While the theoretical discussion above considers only aggregation from the finely disaggregated 
product  level  up  to the  composite  goods  used  in  a  large-scale  model,  we  need  to take  into 
account two other levels of aggregation in applied modeling. The first of these arises from the 
practical problem that some regions in most global models will be aggregates covering more than 
one economy. A second is the fact that the six-digit products considered above are likely to 
include varieties supplied by different countries. We deal with this by using three different levels 
of nesting in the model.  
At the highest level of aggregation, in cases where we have multiple importing countries in 
an importing region, we assume CES preferences across importing countries with an elasticity of 
substitution σ0. At the second level of aggregation, we assume CES preferences over the HS6 
products within the composite goods appearing in the version of the model that we use. At this 
stage, our HS6 products are aggregates over varieties imported from all supplying regions. At 
this level, we use the procedures identified in section (3.1) for the expenditure and tariff revenue 
aggregators,  with  elasticity  of  substitution  σ1.  At  the  third  level,  we  follow  the  Armington 
approach, assuming CES preferences across the six-digit varieties from different exporters. At 
this stage, we use an elasticity of substitution, σ2 between the products provided by different 
suppliers.  
Parameters 
Given the approach to implementation that we have chosen, we need values of three different 
elasticities of substitution 0, 1 and 2: 15 
 
  0 is assumed to be equal to 1. We choose this value to hold constant each importer‘s 
share in the value of imports, primarily for want of better information; 
  1  is determined  by the elasticity of  substitution  between  imported six-digit products 
from all sources within a composite good—such as between apples and oranges within a 
composite of vegetables and fruits; 
  2  is the elasticity of substitution  between  varieties of six-digit products supplied  by 
different countries/regions.  
Assuming  small  trade  shares  for  each  product,  which  seems  a  generally  reasonable 
approximation  given  that  we  have  over  five  thousand  commodities  at  the  HS6  level,  these 
elasticities of substitution seem likely to be very close to the elasticities of demand within the 
group.  This  allows  us  to  draw  on  a  number  of  relevant  sets  of  parameter  estimates  in  the 
literature. Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) provide estimates import demand elasticities at the 
six digit level, which average -3.12 for all HS products. These differ from the σ1 elasticities that 
we seek in including substitution between domestic and imported varieties of the same six-digit 
product. Thus, if we were considering a fruit composite, we would include only substitution 
between imported apples, oranges and pears, while the Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga elasticities 
would  allow  substitution  between  domestic  and  imported  varieties  of  each  product.  The 
exclusion of apples-to-apples comparisons suggests that our elasticities of substitution might be 
lower than the average for Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga. However, the high level of disaggregation 
at which we work suggests that our elasticities of substitution should not be too much lower than 
the Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga estimates. 
Some other indirect evidence on the elasticities of interest is provided by Hummels and 
Klenow (2005, p712), drawing on Hummels (2001). They consider elasticities of substitution 
between  varieties  that  are  differentiated  by  HS  six-digit  product  and  by  country  of  origin, 
concluding that these elasticities generally lie between five and ten. To the extent that these 
elasticities reflect the margins of substitution associated with both σ1 and σ2, we might expect 
them to be greater than our σ1 elasticities of substitution but less than our desired estimates for 
σ2. Broda and Weinstein (2006, p548) define varieties as goods produced by different countries, 
so that their elasticities of substitution are comparable to our σ2 measures. They find (2006, 
p568),  that  the  elasticity  rises  sharply  as  the  categories  considered  become  more  finely 
distinguished, and estimated an average elasticity of substitution for products at the SITC-5 level 16 
 
(a  slightly  coarser  level  than  HS6)  of  13.1  as  against  4.0  at  the  SITC-3  level.  In  our  core 
scenario, we use σ1=2, but also consider alternative values in a sensitivity analysis. For σ2, we 
use 10 in our base case, and also perform sensitivity analysis. 
In earlier simulation work (Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2011), we found 
that the  aggregate  welfare  effects  of  reform  were  quite  sensitive  to the  value  of  σ1  but  not 
particularly  sensitive  to the  value  of  σ2.  This  result  reflects  the  fact  that there  is  enormous 
variation in tariff rates across commodities, relative to the variation in tariff rates across sources 
of supply. Where tariffs are ad valorem and applied on a Most-Favored-Nation basis, there is, of 
course, no variation in tariff rates across suppliers. While this situation is, unfortunately, less 
common than might be hoped, the degree of discrimination across suppliers is reduced by WTO 
rules requiring that all tariffs be included in preferential trade arrangements, and permitting only 
a limited range of non-reciprocal preferences to developing countries (Hoekman, Martin and 
Braga 2009).  
One important question is whether agricultural products should have higher values of σ1 
than  non-agricultural  products.  At  first  blush,  this  seems  a  reasonable  proposition  given  the 
distinction by Rauch (1999) of goods into three groups—commodity; reference-priced goods; 
and differentiated goods. Elasticities of substitution between suppliers are likely to be higher 
between commodities than between reference-priced goods, and lowest of all for differentiated 
products, as found by Broda and Weinstein (2006). But the elasticities of substitution that matter 
for our analysis are not those between suppliers (σ2), but those between products (σ1). It is far 
from clear that the elasticity of substitution between apples and cauliflowers should be higher 
than the elasticity of substitution between iron and steel. In the absence of hard econometric 
evidence  on  the  relative  values  of  the  elasticities  of  substitution  between  agricultural 
commodities and those between other commodities in the product groups we use for analysis, we 
use the same values in all commodity groups. 
 
4  Comparing Agricultural and Non-agricultural Liberalization 
To compare the potential relative importance of liberalization in agriculture against that from 
non-agriculture, we consider the impacts of full liberalization in each sector relative to the effects 17 
 
of total liberalization. The specific commodities used for the modeling are set out in the 
Appendix.  
Key results are summarized in Table 3, which shows the estimated welfare benefits of 
reform for industrial and developing countries.  The table shows these benefits both by the region 
undertaking the reform, and by agricultural and non-agricultural trade liberalization. In the left-
hand side of the table, these results are given in US dollars, relative to the 2004 benchmark year 
for the GTAP v7 database used in the analysis. In the right-hand side of the table, they are shown 
in percentage terms relative to the total welfare gain of $257.9bn per year estimated from global 
trade reform.  
With the dataset used in the analysis, agricultural trade liberalization accounts for nearly 
79 percent of the total welfare gains from global trade reform even when a standard aggregator is 
used. The large increase relative to the finding of Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2006) appears to reflect the move to a more recent database for global trade. Using the optimal 
aggregator raises this share by two percentage points, to just under 81 percent. In the industrial 
countries, the share of the overall gain coming from agricultural liberalization rises from 65 
percent to 75 percent. In the developing countries, the situation is more complex because 
liberalization of their own non-agricultural sectors is estimated to have negative welfare effects 
when the standard weighted-average aggregator is used. With the optimal aggregator, 
agricultural liberalization contributes 92 percent of the welfare gains to developing countries. 
Much more striking is the increase in the share of developing countries in the total 
gains—an increase reported in Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2011). Using the 
optimal aggregator, this gain accrues primarily as a result of developing countries own 
liberalization, rather than primarily as a consequence of liberalization in the high-income 
countries. The most important source of this gain is the virtual disappearance of the apparent 
losses to developing countries from own-liberalization in their non-agricultural sectors. 
  
 
Table 3 Welfare results for liberalization by country groups and by commodity. 














Standard aggregation       
 
     
  
              Developing countries liberalize: 
              Agriculture and food processing  25.9  10.4  36.3 
 
17.6  7.1  24.7 
Other goods and services  -15.6  44.5  28.9 
 
-10.6  30.2  19.6 
All goods and services  10.3  55.0  65.2 
 
7.0  37.3  44.3 
High-income countries liberalize: 
              Agriculture and food processing  18.2  61.6  79.8 
 
12.4  41.8  54.2 
Other goods and services  8.8  -6.6  2.2 
 
6.0  -4.5  1.5 
All goods and services  27.1  55.0  82.0 
 
18.4  37.3  55.7 
All countries liberalize 
              Agriculture and food processing  44.2  72.0  116.1 
 
30.0  48.9  78.8 
Other goods and services  -6.8  38.0  31.1 
 
-4.6  25.8  21.2 
All goods and services  37.4  109.9  147.3 
 
25.4  74.6  100.0 
  
              Optimal aggregation       
 
     
        
 
     
Developing countries liberalize: 
              Agriculture and food processing  44.2  14.0  58.3 
 
17.1  5.4  22.6 
Other goods and services  -2.0  45.6  43.6 
 
-0.8  17.7  16.9 
All goods and services  42.2  59.6  101.8 
 
16.3  23.1  39.5 
High-income countries liberalize: 
              Agriculture and food processing  32.2  118.1  150.3 
 
12.5  45.8  58.3 
Other goods and services  8.7  -2.9  5.8 
 
3.4  -1.1  2.3 
All goods and services  40.9  115.2  156.1 
 
15.9  44.7  60.5 
All countries liberalize 
              Agriculture and food processing  76.4  132.1  208.5 
 
29.6  51.2  80.9 
Other goods and services  6.7  42.7  49.4 
 
2.6  16.6  19.1 
All goods and services  83.1  174.8  257.9 
 
32.2  67.8  100.0 
Source: Linkage model Simulations.  
 
The share of the agricultural gain to developing countries coming from their own 
agricultural liberalization – as a group – remains roughly constant, at around 60 percent as is 
evident in Figure 3. In the high income countries, the share of this gain coming from own 
liberalization is much higher, at around 86 percent using the standard weighted averages, and 
rises to 89 percent using the optimal aggregator. However, in each case, the important change is 
the increase in the magnitude of the gains from agricultural trade reform, rather than the increase 
in the importance of those obtained from own-liberalization. 
Figure 3 The importance of own-liberalization in the gains from agricultural trade reform 
 
Source: Linkage model Simulations. 
 
Going to the country/region level shows a similar picture. On Figure 4 we display the ratio of the 
agricultural liberalization welfare effects over the absolute value of welfare changes for both 
agricultural and non agricultural trade liberalization. For all developed countries/regions
5, except 
Japan, included in the analysis the role of agricultural trade liberalization is reinforced. Interestingly, 
for another highly protected and distorted region – rest of Western Europe (Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland) – no changes take place. For the European Union, the share of agricultural liberalization 
                                                 
5 Australia and New Zealand, United States of America, Canada, Japan, the European Union, South Korea and 
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increases from 73 to 88 percent. This comparison shows that even if we expect that for highly distorted 
regions the optimal aggregator will magnify welfare gains, this is not always the case and the use of a 
global CGE remains important. Indeed, positive effects on consumer welfare are counter balanced by 
terms-of-trade effects at the macro level (large volume increase of imports). However, for traditional 
exporters, such as Australia and New Zealand, or Canada the effects is unambiguous and both the 
domestic trade reform and the terms-of-trade effects of global liberalization move in the same direction. 
Figure 4 Role of AMA liberalization in total welfare changes 
 
Note: The contribution of AMA liberalization is measured as the welfare changes in dollars driven by the 
agricultural liberalization divided by the sum of the absolute value of welfare change due to AMA and 
NAMA liberalization. 
Source: Linkage model Simulations. 
 
For developing countries, the picture is much more contrasted and if for exporters, such 
as Brazil or India, see the role of agricultural trade liberalization increased, some exporters, as 
Chile face a different situation. Indeed, in Figure 4, Chile is in the low-right quadrant, implying 
that the agricultural liberalization has moved to a positive contribution to a negative one. This 
y = 1.1855x - 0.1271
R² = 0.7122













































effect is driven by a particular evolution of the terms of trade for this country. Indeed, even if it 
should have benefited from the removal of distorted foreign trade policies, but, it suffers mainly 
from preference erosion in major markets, such as Mercosur, the US and the EU, with which it 
has already has Free-Trade-Agreements. With the optimal aggregator approach, the exports of its 
competitors on these markets become much more attractive, due to the elimination of distorted 
tariffs when Chilean exports, facing no distortions, could not benefit from this effect. For another 
region, rest of sub Saharan Africa in the low right quadrant, in a similar situation and most 
effects play against this region: the negative contribution to welfare change of the agricultural 
liberalization is increased. Overall, we check that the effect of the optimal aggregator on the role 
of agricultural trade liberalization is stronger for developing countries (lower R
2 in the 
correlation between the results of the two aggregators for developing countries, with a steeper 
slope). This result is confirmed by Figure 5 (absolute gains in level) and Appendix 3 that looks at 
the regression in the change of results based on tariff distribution indicators. 
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Figure 5 Absolute gains (bn USD)  in AMA and NAMA at the country/region level with 
alternative aggregators 
 
Source: Linkage model Simulations. 
 
5  Conclusions 
Traditional approaches to aggregation of trade distortions ignore the variations in trade barriers within the 
broad sectors used in the analysis, and tend to underweight the importance of products subject to high 
trade barriers. Because of this, it seems likely that they will underestimate the benefits of agricultural 
trade reform given the high variation in agricultural trade barriers in many countries. The purpose of this 
paper is to apply a new approach to aggregating trade barriers in order to assess whether it is, indeed, the 
case that the potential contribution of agricultural trade reform to the potential benefits of national and 
global trade reform rises when the benefits of reform are correctly measured.  
We use a new approach to aggregation that takes into account the importance of variations in 
trade barriers within the composite sectors used for analysis for the welfare implications of reform. It does 
y = 1.8354x - 0.2141
R² = 0.8476
y = 2.314x - 4.4723
R² = 0.8525
y = 1.0098x + 0.5583
R² = 0.9946
















































this by identifying two different tariff aggregators for each sector—one that is optimal for representing 
the effects on expenditure of changes in disaggregated tariffs, and one that represents the effects of 
changes in tariffs on government revenues raised. This approach allows us to measure more accurately the 
impacts of changes in protection on the full welfare impacts—including those arising from changes in the 
terms of trade—of trade policy reforms.  
With the database used, the share of the potential benefits of global trade reform coming from 
agriculture is already very high, at over three quarters. Our analysis finds that moving to optimal 
aggregators leads to small increases—in the order of two percentage points—in the share of the potential 
global welfare benefits from reform.   
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Commodity Aggregation Used in the Analysis 
 
For the analysis  in this paper, we aggregated the 57 commodities  included  in the GTAP v7 
database into the following 26 commodities for use in the model. The tariff aggregators were 
estimated for each of these commodity groups prior to undertaking the analysis. For the reasons 
outlined in the text, the results of the analysis should be much less vulnerable to differences in 
the extent to which one sector has been arbitrarily disaggregated more than another.  
 
ric  Rice 
gro  Other grains 
osd  Oil seeds 
sug  Sugar 
pfb  Plant-based fibers 
v_f  Vegetables and fruits 
ocr  Other crops 
lvs  Livestock 
onr  Other natural resources 
ffl  Fossil fuels 
pmt  Processed meats 
vol  Vegetable oils and fats 
mil  Dairy products 
ofd  Other food 
b_t  Beverages and tobacco 
tex  Textile 
wap  Wearing apparel 
lea  Leather 
crp  Chemicals rubber and plastics 
i_s  Iron and steel 
mvh  Motor vehicles and parts 
cgd  Capital goods 
omf  Other manufacturing 
cns  Construction 
svc  Utilities and services 
 






This appendix provides the detailed results at the country/region level used in and . 
  Share in absolute 
variation(1) 
Welfare AMA - Bns USD  Welfare NAMA - Bns 
USD 












World total  79%  81%  116.2  208.6  30.9  48.9 
             
Bangladesh  -37%  -20%  -0.3  -0.1  -0.4  -0.4 
Brazil  87%  91%  5.5  13.0  0.8  1.3 
Chile  13%  -42%  0.0  -0.1  0.2  0.2 
China  40%  96%  1.5  2.4  -2.2  -0.1 
Egypt  69%  31%  0.2  0.9  -0.1  2.1 
India  81%  96%  4.2  7.1  -1.0  -0.3 
Indonesia  87%  89%  1.3  1.3  -0.2  0.2 
Pakistan  63%  11%  0.7  0.0  -0.4  -0.3 
Thailand  81%  74%  2.2  2.7  0.5  1.0 
Mexico  46%  78%  0.7  2.6  -0.9  -0.8 
Nigeria  55%  58%  1.3  1.8  1.1  1.3 
Turkey  79%  89%  1.8  4.4  0.5  0.6 
Rest of Asia  90%  76%  8.0  9.5  0.9  2.9 
Rest of LAC  68%  75%  4.2  3.9  -2.0  -1.3 
Morocco & Tunisia  81%  97%  2.0  3.2  -0.5  -0.1 
SACU  90%  90%  1.2  2.7  0.1  0.3 
Rest of Sub Saharan 
Africa 
-37%  -93%  -0.3  -0.8  -0.5  0.1 
Rest of the World  74%  97%  8.9  20.6  -3.1  -0.6 
             
Australia and New 
Zealand 
84%  96%  3.0  3.1  -0.6  0.1 
Rest of Europe  91%  91%  6.3  14.4  0.6  1.5 
EU 27  73%  88%  27.1  70.7  9.8  10.0 
United States  48%  51%  4.2  6.0  4.5  5.7 
Canada  56%  68%  2.0  3.2  -1.6  -1.5 
Japan  50%  47%  15.0  14.4  15.3  15.9 
Korea and Taiwan  65%  69%  15.0  20.8  8.1  9.2 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
23%  29%  0.5  0.8  1.8  1.9 
Note: (1) The contribution of AMA liberalization is measured as the welfare changes in dollars driven by 
the agricultural liberalization divided by the sum of the absolute value of welfare change due to AMA and 
NAMA liberalization. 
Source: Linkage Model Simulations 




Estimated contribution of the ex-ante within sector coefficient of variation of the power of 
tariff  
 
In this section, we estimate the elasticities of welfare changes (percent) using the optimal 
aggregator vs the standard aggregator to the average of the within-sector coefficient of variation 
(CV) of the power of the tariff expressed as a percentage. This test aims to check if ex-ante 
information on the tariff distribution is sufficient to explain the changes in welfare impact 
computed with the standard or the optimal aggregator. If for NAMA liberalization, the initial 
coefficient of variation of applied tariffs appears to explain the changes observed for agricultural 
liberalization, this result holds only for Developing countries for which an increase in 1 point of 
the coefficient of variation raise the welfare gains by 0.05 percentage point. This result confirms 
our previous findings for which some countries (e.g. Japan, or Rest of Western Europe) were not 
positively affected by the use of the optimal aggregator despite large distortions. 
 
  Impacts on AMA liberalization 
effects  
Impact on NAMA 
liberalization effects 
All countries  AMA applied Tariff CV: ns  NAMA applied Tariff CV: 
0.04** 
Developed countries  AMA applied Tariff CV:ns  NAMA applied Tariff CV: 
0.008** 
Developing countries  AMA applied Tariff CV:0.05**  NAMA applied Tariff CV: 
0.07** 
Note:  
ns stands for non significant, * coefficient significant at 5 percent, ** coefficient significant at 2 percent. 
Source: Linkage model Simulations. 
 
 